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ABSTRACT  
As an area of research, specifying crucial conditions under which international public 
administration (IPA) may enjoy independence from member-state governments has become an 
increasingly vibrant research area. This special issue responds to three yet unresolved research 
tasks: (i) Systematically comparing IPAs by offering large-N data across cases; (ii) Taking 
organization seriously by identifying how the organisational architectures of IPAs affect 
decision-making processes and subsequently the pursuit of public policy making; (iii) Examining 
the varied consequences of the autonomization of IPAs, notably for member-state public sector 
governance and for the integration of transnational regulatory regimes. 
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International bureaucracies constitute a distinct and increasingly important feature of both 
global governance studies and public administration scholarship. This special issue offers one 
vital step in advancing these types of studies by offering a ‘public administration’ approach. This 
entails that the study of international governmental organizations (IGOs) become somehow 
‘normalized’, i.e. that a public administration turn comes to characterize IGO studies (Trondal 
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2007). Recent studies have suggested that international public administration (IPA) profoundly 
influence global governance (Biermann and Siebenhüner 2009), transform power distributions 
across levels of government (Egeberg and Trondal 2009), and change the conduct of domestic 
public sector governance (Keohane et al. 2009). Moreover, IPAs are called upon to cope with 
ever more wicked and unruly public problems. Turbulence in world politics is partly caused by 
turbulent political-administrative systems, partly by turbulent environments, and partly by how 
organizations and their environments poorly match – thus creating turbulence of scale. 
Together these challenges produce complexity, uncertainty, and time constraints for decision-
makers. Turbulence of these kinds reveals the fragility of existing institutions and serves as test-
beds for the sustainability of existing governance arrangements. IPAs may be seen as one 
coping mechanism in an ever more turbulent global scene (Ansell et al. 2016). 
 
Yet, public administration scholarship has largely deserted the comparative study of IPAs, 
including its multilevel character (Benz et al. 2016 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE 
DETAILS AT PROOF>). In this light, the current special issue is particularly welcomed. Moreover, 
this lacuna reflects generic gulfs between most social science sub-disciplines. For instance, 
despite vast scholarship on both (public sector) governance and organization theory, 
respectively, these strands of research have been in mutual disregard (e.g. Kettl 2002; Olsen 
2010). Moreover, the empirical foci of several social science sub-disciplines often poorly 
intersect: For instance, whereas research on public sector organizations has largely focused on 
domestic ministerial departments and subordinate agencies (e.g. Verhoest et al. 2012), IGO 
scholarship has paid scant attention to their bureaucratic interior (e.g. Hawkins et al. 2006; 
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Karns and Mingst 2004). Besides, European Union studies have primarily been preoccupied with 
studying the European Commission and subordinated regulatory agencies and largely neglected 
systematic comparative assessments (the N=1 fallacy) (e.g. Bauer and Trondal 2015).  
 
Modern governments daily formulate and execute policies with significant consequences for 
society. With the growing role of IPAs, one unresolved question is to what extent and under 
what conditions such institutions may formulate their own policies – and pursue a de facto 
autonomous regulatory agenda - and thereby transcend a mere intergovernmental secretarial 
role. The leeway of IGOs is arguably to a large extent supplied by the autonomy of its 
bureaucratic arm, that is, by the ability of IPAs to act relatively independently of decision 
premises that emanate from member-state governments (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; 
Biermann and Siebenhüner 2009, 2013; Cox and Jacobson 1973; Reinalda 2013; Trondal 2013). 
This special issue illuminates that IPAs are indeed rule-makers and sometimes even rule-
implementers. It is thus essential to know how autonomous IPAs are and how it can be 
explained. Scholars of various disciplines have started to explore the conditions under which 
IPAs are ‘truly’ independent of member-state governments, yet, the findings remain 
inconclusive (e.g., Beyers 2010; Checkel 2007; Moravcsik 1999). IPAs are seen as rifted between 
member-state dominance, the concern for the collective good, administrative ‘siloization’ and 
portfolio concerns, as well as transnational regulatory institutions driven by epistemic 
communities of experts (Trondal et al. 2015). As a consequence, academics, politicians and IPA 
officials have different views on the independent role of IPAs. This special issue indeed aims to 
connect some of the dots by offering new empirical findings.  
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THEORIZING IPAs: Beyond mapping 
One necessary factor in building common political order is the establishment of common 
institutions, including a permanent congress independent of national governments serving the 
common interest (Skowronek 1982). In an international context it necessitates the rise of 
separate international institutions that are able to act relatively independently. IPAs might 
indeed be such institutions. Whilst the empirical puzzle is to what extent IPAs enjoy de facto 
independence, the ensuing theoretical puzzle is to specify conditions thereof (Bauer and Ege 
2016 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>). This special issue offers 
advances to both puzzles. It is shown that the task of IPAs has become increasingly that of 
active and independent policy-making institutions and less that of passive technical supply 
instruments for IGO plenary assemblies.  
 
The classical study of IGOs did not permit an independent role for IPAs (Knill and Bauer 2016 
<THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>). International-relations 
approaches viewed IGOs as epiphenomena to interstate relations. Regime literature similarly 
downplayed the organisational dimension of IGOs, and IGOs were largely seen as regime 
facilitators (Gehring 2003: 11). The seminal work of Cox and Jacobson (1973: 428) reflected this 
view by concluding that ‘international organizations facilitate the orderly management of 
intergovernmental relations without significantly changing the structure of power that governs 
these relations…’. The 1960s and 1970s saw several studies of IGOs that treated them as hubs 
of international networks and regimes rather than as organizations and institutions in their own 
right (e.g. Nye 1975). The epistemic community literature focused on IGOs as facilitators of 
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transnational epistemic communities (E. Haas 1990; P. Haas 1992). This literature made 
‘experts’ and their ‘ways of doing things’ ever more paramount to studies of proposing, 
implementing and legitimizing public policy (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Joerges 1999; 
Joerges et al. 1997: 7).  
 
Concomitantly, beyond single-case studies of IPAs there were a surprising shortage of 
theoretically-informed comparative studies of their inner life and their wider role in global 
governance (Claude 1956). Consequently, ‘to date, we do not really know how to conceptualize 
international organizations and how to deal with the organizational components…’ of IPAs 
(Gehring 2003: 13). The research challenge targeted by this special issue is to bring IPAs back 
into the study of global governance and the study of public administration (Knill and Bauer 2016 
<THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>; Eckhard and Ege 2016 <THIS 
ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>).  
 
Assuming that IPAs ‘matter’ entails that we should take seriously how they are organized and 
how this may have consequences for decision-making processes and the subsequent pursuit of 
public policy making. In the classical study of decision-making processes in organizations, 
organizations were seen as permitting stable expectations providing general stimuli and 
attention directors to actors (Mintrom 2015). Yet, the way organizational structure shapes 
interaction, loyalty, cooperation, and information-processing are more adequately recognized 
in the organization theory literature than in most other social science literatures – for example 
the IGO literature (e.g. Cox and Jacobsen 1973), the governance literature (e.g. Levi-Faur 2012) 
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as well as brother political science literatures (Olsen 2006). This special issue suggests that IPAs 
cannot be adequately understood without including organizational variables. Doing so implies 
bringing organizational structure and ways of organizing back into IGO studies. Organizational 
structure can be defined as role expectations with regard to who can and should do what, how 
and when. In this sense, the organization structure is a formalized, impersonal and normative 
structure that analytically separates structure from decision behaviour or process (Scott 1981). 
The organizational structure of IPAs consists both of the structure of the administration as well 
as how this structure is embedded in the wider IGO structure.  
 
An organizational theory approach assumes that IPAs may possess ‘own’ organizational 
capacities that automize the behaviour of own administrative staff. This may happen through 
mechanisms such as control (behavioral adaptation through hierarchical control and 
supervision), discipline (behavioral adaptation through incentive systems), and/or socialization 
(behavioral internalization through established bureaucratic cultures) (Page 1992; Weber 
1983). These mechanisms ensure that IPAs may perform their tasks relatively independently 
from outside pressure but within boundaries set by the legal authority and (political) leadership 
of which they serve (Weber 1924). Causal emphasis is put on the internal organizational 
structures of IPAs. This idea offers a picture of formal organizations as creators of 
‘organizational man’ (Simon 1965) and as a stabilizing element in politics more broadly (Olsen 
2010). IPAs may thus develop their own nuts and bolts quite independently of society, and 
concomitantly that international civil servants may act upon roles that are shaped by the IPA in 
which they are embedded.  
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How can we adequately and accurately measure autonomy? The concept of bureaucratic 
autonomy has not been neatly defined in literature. A working definition applied has been that 
‘autonomy is about discretion, or the extent to which [an organization] can decide itself about 
matters that it considers important’ (Verhoest et al. 2010: 18–19). Whereas most literature on 
the independence of public sector organizations assesses autonomy by considering their de jure 
formal-legal design (e.g., Gilardi 2008; Huber and Shipan 2002), far less attention has been 
devoted to studying real-life autonomy of IPAs, for instance through how IPA staff themselves 
perceive their autonomy (Maggetti and Verhoest 2014: 245; Trondal 2010: 147). Bauer and Ege 
(2016 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>) capture autonomy by 
studying the capacity of the administration to develop autonomous preferences (‘autonomy of 
will’) and its ability to translate these preferences into action (‘autonomy of action’). 
 
How then can we explain the autonomy of IPAs? This special issue suggests that organizational 
factors may be useful. One rationale for emphasising organizational factors is that ‘the evidence 
remains still quite inconclusive about the effects of formal structural-organizational factors on 
the autonomy of agencies’ and their employees’ autonomy perceptions (Maggetti and Verhoest 
2014: 247). Organizational factors include organization structure, organizational location, 
organizational demography and organizational culture (Egeberg et al. 2016). This special issue 
discusses two such variables: organizational structure and temporal sorting. This commentary 
would also add socialization dynamics to this discussion (see below).  
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Organizational structure: It is shown by this special issue that the role of IPAs reflects, broadly 
speaking, how they are organized. Similar organizational structures may for example account 
for why administrative styles are rather similar across IPAs (Knill et al. 2016 <THIS ISSUE: 
PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>). Organizational capacities may also account 
for the strong role of DG Budget in EU’s new budgetary procedure (Goetz and Patz 2016 <THIS 
ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>). Yet, proponents of an organizational 
theory approach (Egeberg et al. 2016) do not claim to provide a complete or comprehensive 
explanation of policy processes and policy contents. Rather, the argument is that organizational 
factors (independent variables) might intervene in actors’ behavioural perceptions (dependent 
variable) and create a systematic bias, thus making some process characteristics and outputs 
more likely than others (Gulick 1937; March and Olsen 1984; Simon 1965). Organizations 
provide frames for storing experiences, cognitive maps categorizing complex information, 
procedures for reducing transaction costs, regulative norms that add cues for appropriate 
behaviour, and physical boundaries and temporal rhythms that guide actors' perceptions of 
relevance with respect to administrative behaviour. Organizations also discriminate between 
which conflicts should be attended to and which should be de-emphasized (Egeberg 2006). By 
organizing civil servants into permanent bureaucracies within IGOs, a system of ‘rule followers 
and role players’ is established relatively independently of the domestic branch of executive 
government (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; March and Olsen 1998: 952). 
 
One can assume, for instance, that organizational affiliations would matter for the autonomy of 
IPAs. One initial proposition is that the supply of independent administrative capacities in IPAs 
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represents a primary organizational structure for IPA staff, whereas their secondary structures 
consist of part-time (such as transnational networks) or past organizational memberships (such 
as previous employments). IPAs serve as the primary organizational affiliation for international 
civil servants, rendering them particularly sensitive to the organizational signals and selections 
provided by this structure. The autonomy perceptions evoked by officials may thus be expected 
to be primarily directed towards those administrative units that are the primary supplier of 
relevant decision premises. Because IPA officials spend most of their time and energy in sub-
units of their primary organizations, they may be expected to chiefly attend to concerns of IPA 
subunits and less towards IGO as wholes (Ashforth and Johnson 2001: 36). Subsequently, IPA 
personnel are likely to orient their behaviour towards their present IPA units rather than to the 
concerns of member state governments. Administrative staff is thus expected to evoke ‘inward-
looking’ behavioural patterns geared towards their ‘own’ sub-units and task environments. We 
may expect that IPA officials evoke Weberian virtues of party-political neutrality, attaching 
identity towards their divisions and portfolios, and attending chiefly to administrative rules and 
proper procedures of their primary structure (Richards and Smith 2004). 
 
A second assumption would be that the autonomy of IPAs is facilitated by how they are 
organizationally specialized. For example, administrative styles (see Knill et al. 2016 <THIS 
ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>) may vary systematically between 
organizational sub-units – reflecting the departmentalization of IPAs. Organizations tend to 
accumulate conflicting organizational principles through horizontal and vertical specialization. 
When specializing formal organizations horizontally, one important principle (among several) is 
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by major purpose served like research, health, food safety, etc. (Gulick 1937). This principle of 
specialization is recurrent inside IPAs. For example, the European Commission is a horizontally 
pillarized administration, specialized by purpose and with historically weak organizational 
capabilities for horizontal coordination at the top through administrative coordination and 
Presidential oversight (Dimitrakopoulos and Kassim 2005). However, recent administrative 
reforms and enhanced presidential ambitions to ‘get the house in order’ have improved such 
capacities somewhat (e.g. Kassim et al. 2013). Similarly, the WTO and OECD secretariats are 
also specialized administrations consisting of divisions or directorates responsible for different 
areas of cooperation, such as agriculture, environment, development, statistics, etc. This 
principle of organization tends to activate administrative styles among incumbents following 
sectoral cleavages. For example, coordination and contact patterns tend to be channeled within 
sectoral portfolios rather than between them. Arguably, organization by ‘major purpose served’ 
is likely to bias decision-making dynamics inwards toward the bureaucratic organization where 
preferences, contact patterns, roles, and loyalties are directed toward sectoral portfolios, 
divisions, and units. This mode of horizontal specialization results in less than adequate 
horizontal coordination across departmental units and better coordination within units (Ansell 
2004: 237). The horizontal specialization of IPAs by major purpose is thus conducive to their 
autonomization. 
 
Temporal sorting: One often forgotten organizational variable in organization studies – as well 
as in the study of IPAs – is the temporal variable. This issue brings this variable back in (Goetz 
and Patz 2016 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>). As amplified by 
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the garbage can approach, behavior and change in organizations have a temporal dimension 
(Cohen et al. 1976). As with the garbage can theory of organizations or the multiple streams 
approach to public policy, temporal complexity calls attention to the dynamic and sometimes 
paradoxical interaction of problems and solutions. The clash of time scales generates temporal 
complexity. A solution may lead a problem to change, cause new problems, or simply have 
trouble keeping up with the changing nature of problems. Temporal complexity should thus be 
one essential ingredient in our assessment of IPAs. For instance, polyrhythmic IPAs with several 
tempi would for example be considered more turbulent than IPAs geared towards only one 
tempo. Several rhythmic patterns may also concurrently co-exist in a mutually competing – yet 
compatible – whole. When several rhythmic patterns are layered like this, the resulting 
temporal system inside IPAs may become complex and challenging, but at the same time 
unlocking possibilities for innovation and change that are embedded in each pattern. Temporal 
complexity should thus be one essential ingredient in our assessment of IPAs. 
 
We may also consider that certain temporal patterns within organizations match more easily 
with certain temporal patterns in the environments. For example, poly-rhythmic IPAs may 
relatively easily adapt to multiple and shifting rhythms in member-states. Mono-rhythmic IPAs, 
by contrast, would face relatively more uncertainty and risk if faced with multi-rhythmic 
member-states. Moreover, unsettled and weakly institutionalized IPAs with high temporal 
complexity might arguably adapt more easily to turbulent environments with high temporal 
complexity than settled and strongly institutionalized IPAs with low temporal complexity. 
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A second temporal variable is tempo, or speed. One might assume that with increased speed 
comes a tendency for repetition. During turbulent times when the tempo in IPAs increases, 
established governance practices might be subject to test. So, turbulence is likely to be 
inversely correlated with speed. High-speed governance processes are thus likely to experience 
a tendency to repeat past successes, or what is perceived as past successes (March 2010: 16). 
By repeating this way, IPAs may be victims of trained incapacity to improvise – merely due to 
high speed of conduct. Taking the example of jazz as a temporally sorted activity, jazz musicians 
may play very fast tunes, with the likely consequence of repetition of patterns just ‘to keep the 
performance going’ (Weick 1998: 553). Slow moving jazz, by contrast, would enable musicians’ 
larger leeway for embellishment of items. Thus, up-tempo decision-making within IPAs may 
reduce the likelihood of exploration or innovation. But it may also speak to the need for an 
enhanced diversity of governance repertoires. 
 
Socialization dynamics: Supplementing the role of organizational structures and temporal 
sorting, governing IPAs may also be subject to socialization effects. A vast literature reveals that 
the impact of pre-socialization of actors is modified by organizational re-socialization (e.g. 
Checkel 2007). Arguably, IPAs with a high socialization potential would more effectively 
automize its staff compared to IPAs with weaker socialization potential. Officials entering IPAs 
for the first time are subject to an organizational ‘exposure effect’ (Johnston 2005: 1039) that 
may contribute to such re-socialization. Socialization is a dynamic process whereby staff are 
induced into the norms and rules of a given community. By this process, individuals may come 
to gradually internalize some shared norms and rules of the community (Checkel 2007). 
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Socialization processes are conducive to ‘autonomization’ of the socialized, because the one 
socializing may educate, indoctrinate, teach, or diffuse his or her norms and ideas to the one 
being socialized. The socialization argument also claims that behavioral autonomy is 
conditioned by enduring experiences with institutions, accompanying perceptions of 
appropriate behavior (Herrmann and Brewer 2004: 14). The potential for socialization to occur 
is assumed positively related to the duration and the intensity of interaction amongst the 
organizational members. Chief to the neo-functionalist approach, the potential for re-
socialization to occur (‘shift of loyalty toward a new center’) is assumed positively associated 
with the duration and the intensity of interaction among actors (Haas 1958: 16). Intensive in-
group interaction is assumed conducive to the emergence of relative stabile social, normative, 
and strategic networks that provide autonomous impact on the participants’ perceptions of 
strategic and appropriate behavior (Atkinson and Coleman 1992: 161; Hay and Richards 2000). 
In sum, the length of stay in IPAs—or the individual seniority of incumbents—may foster 
socialization toward a supranational behavioral pattern. Concomitantly, behavioral and role 
autonomy is nurtured by the sheer quantity and quality of actor-interaction inside IPAs.  
 
LOOKING AHEAD 
There has been a lack of three kinds of IPA studies which this issue responds to:  
(i) Systematic comparative studies of IPAs by offering large-N data across cases (e.g. 
Barnett and Finnemore 2004); 
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(ii) Studies that takes organization seriously analyzing how the organisational architectures 
of IPAs may bias their everyday governance processes and subsequently the pursuit of 
public policy making (e.g. Trondal et al. 2010);  
(iii) Studies that examines the varied consequences of the autonomization of IPAs, notably 
for member-state public sector governance (e.g. Bach et al. 2015) as well as for 
transnational regulatory regimes (e.g. Abbott et al. 2016). 
–  
Departing from the latter challenge, one promising research avenue is what kind of 
consequences that may emanate from the autonomization of IPAs. Studies of the European 
Commission suggest that capacity-building inside IPAs enables them to build ever-closer 
administrative networks with other IPAs and to pool administrative resources among these into 
some kind of common administrative capacity. IPAs may, for instance, capture agendas of other 
actors – such as member-state government institutions. This may fuel the emergence of 
multilevel administrative structures which facilitate policy coordination across levels of 
authority (Benz et al. 2016 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>). 
Studies suggest for instance that the rise of independent administrative capacities around the 
European Commission increase its ability to co-opt administrative sub-centers by stealth – 
notably European Union agencies and domestic agencies. This enhanced ability to co-opt or 
capture, however, probably also reaches towards agencies within IGOs such as the WTO and 
the OECD - thus integrating and pooling global administrative resources. Moreover, studies 
suggest that compatible organizational structures among IPAs increase the likelihood of mutual 
integration among them. This is reflected in the development of direct links between 
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Commission DGs and ‘their’ partner EU agencies (Egeberg et al. 2015) and between Commission 
DGs and domestic agencies and their agency networks (Egeberg et al. 2016). Egeberg and 
Trondal (2009) show for instance that the Commission takes active part in the daily practicing of 
EU legislation within domestic agencies, and thus that Commission DGs in practice partly co-opt 
domestic administrative resources. This example shows that the supply of administrative 
capacities inside IPAs may have profound consequences for emergence of integrated global 
governance infrastructure beyond direct member-state control. This special issue contributes 
both to empirical examination of such infrastructures and inspires future research of these. 
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